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Abstract—Network monitoring is a primordial source of data
in cyber-security since it may reveal abnormal behaviors of
users or applications. Indeed, security analysts and tools like
IDS (Intrusion Detection system) or SIEM (security information
and event management) rely on them as a single source of
information or combined with others. In this paper, we propose a
visualisation method derived from the Mapper algorithm that has
been developed in the field of Topological Data Analysis (TDA).
The developed method and its associated tool are able to analyze
a large number of IP packets in order to make malicious activities
patterns easily observable by security analysts. We applied our
method to darknet data, i.e. from an entire and supposed not used
subnetwork in Internet and we have found that those observable
patterns have been missed by Suricata, a widely used State-of-
the-Art IDS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network monitoring has been extensively used for security,
forensics and anomaly detection with a wide area of research
and industrial developments [1] whose the main objective is
to identify malicious activities based on traffic patterns and
to trigger alerts. Those alerts are often processed by security
experts who can rely on advanced log correlation engines
or SIEM (Security information and event management) for
incident respond purposes [2] with manual investigation or
confirmation as a second step. It is worth noting that opera-
tional security will continue to rely on human experts rather
than full automated methods because even few false positives
(benign traffic dropped) is not acceptable and so needs a
manual examination before final decision. One of the main
challenges is the significance of the visualized data and the
limited volume of data to deliver to the human analysts.
Instead of only relying on monitoring and analyzing events
related to the defended system (e.g. an enterprise information
system), we are considering some noisy traffic which is not
targeted towards real services or hosts and known as Internet
Background Radiation (IBR) [3]. It constitutes an important
source of information for the prediction and the modeling of
Internet malicious activities. IBR data collected from darknets
(network telescopes), has been used to study worms, DDoS
(Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks and scanning activities
[4]. Extracting and modeling these patterns to be used latter
for predicting or better understanding major incidents and
events in Internet is a challenging task. The generated and
the collected IBR data has a considerable volume with a
wide range of services and sources. Making these data useful
requires the extraction of their structure and components to be
able to use them as a source of information.
Therefore, we built a new method to extract and visualize
the malicious components of IBR. The approach relies on
Topological Data Analysis (TDA) [5] methods applied to the
packet-level data to find persistent structures and patterns.
Using this technique is mainly motivated by two reasons.
First, its unsupervised pattern detection is appropriate for
the analysis and classification of these data since we have
no a priori knowledge about them. Second, its visualization
capabilities makes the output understandable and interpretable
by the human experts. We evaluated our method with a dataset
collected from a darknet being a non used but accessible /20
network. Our results shows that our methodology can easily
extract scanning activities and DDoS. Even if they seem rather
basic malicious activities, a widely-deployed IDS, Suricata1,
was not always able to do so.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we provide a description of the related work. Our
method and implementation details are described in Section
III. Experimental results are detailed in Section IV before
drawing the final conclusions and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Many studies have considered the analysis of IBR, mainly
from a statistical perspective to characterise their sources, their
originating networks and their services [3], [6]. The obtained
results are then used to learn about the malicious activities
including worms, viruses, denial of services attacks and their
associated hosts and networks [7].
A main technique for passive monitoring of IBR is darknets.
A darknet [4] is a whole subnetwork, which is announced
over Internet such that packets sent to the IP addresses are
properly routed over. However, this subnetwork does not host
any services and so no legitimate traffic is supposed to reach
it. The entity hosting the darknet is then silently collecting
all incoming packets, i.e. without replying to any of them.
Such an infrastructure is mainly characterized by the size of
1https://suricata-ids.org/
the subnetwork defined by the prefix length. Although such
an approach seems rather limited than more active techniques
like honeypots emulating real services, they have been shown
to be complementary [8], [9].
There have been several papers focusing on the character-
isation of darknet data [4], [10]. Rather than analyzing full
darknet data, examining selected traffic is helpful to address a
particular threat, as for example DNS queries to identify Dr-
DOS (Distributed Reflection Denial of Service) [11]. Fachkha
et al [4], have provided a study of darknet data and the
attack activities that could be investigated throughout its data.
They characterised the main activities of a darknet which are
scanning and worms propagation. They also summarized the
major techniques, including clustering and visualisation, that
have been used to analyze darknet data and to identify the
profiles of the observed threats.
Visualisation of darknet data has been addressed in sev-
eral works [12]. InetVis [13] plots darknet data on a 3D
scatter plot and highlights visual patterns. Although there is
no pre-processing or analysis of the data beforehand, this
tools demonstrate the ability of highlighting malicious activity
against other IDS like Bro or Snort [14]. In [15], authors
have developed a 3D visualisation tool to monitor darknet
traffic in real time. The tool is dedicated to the visualisation
of raw data at the packet level in a 3 dimensions space to
show the alerts with a sphere representing the Internet and
multiple rings to represent the monitored darknets. Similarly
to [13], their engine is only limited to the visualisation without
classification or clustering of darknet monitoring data. Our
developed method is not focusing on the visualization of raw
data, but instead we are only visualising extracted topological
features from darknet data. Existing visualisation techniques
of darknet data could be improved by using our method to
better visualise persistent patterns of observed attacks.
In this work, we mainly rely on Topological Data Analysis
(TDA) which is an emerging field of mathematics that have
been applied in several applications to analyse complex high
dimensional data, including 3D shape matching, structure of
materials and biology [16]. To the best of our knowledge this
is the first work using this technique on security monitoring
events such as packets received by a darknet. We applied TDA,
in particular its mapper method, to extract invariant patterns
of multi dimensional monitoring data collected from a darknet
and to visualise them in 3D environments. The goal is to help
administrators and security analysts to better identify persistent
threats.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Objective
We are tackling the problem of extracting activities from
noisy monitoring data collected by a darknet. The goal is to
identify main perceived activities such as scanning and DDoS
attacks while continuously receiving packets, for instance from
the /20 subnetwork of the darknet used in our experiments.
The available data is collected in May 2016 with a rate of 3
millions packets per day and we considered all the received
packets without filtering and no a priori knowledge.
A technique based on grouping used by an IDS, such as
Suricata, is able to identify some patterns sharing one or
multiple attributes. However, it is not robust to noise and
it is unable to remove that noise to clearly identify all the
attack patterns. We can also rely on clustering and ranking to
detect the patterns by training a model and defining a set of
thresholds to select candidates. However, such methods require
to repeatedly train the models when facing new data.
DDoS or scanning activities are usually observed as lines
on scatter plots where axis represents the ports or IP addresses
like in [13]. For example, in Figure 1, vertical lines can be
assumed as horizontal scans where, for each of them, a single
IP address try to reach all IP addresses of our darknet. Whereas
it is a simple example for illustration purposes, real data is
plotted in Figure 3(a) where both source and destination IP
addresses and ports are plotted. In that case, human eyes
cannot easily distinguished scanned activities whereas they
become finally visible after our analysis in Figure 4 where,
for example, a single source doing horizontal is represented
as a triangle (or slice).
B. Method overview
Detecting activities from darknet events requires the updat-
ing of the detection mechanism output according to the new
arrived events. The events of a darknet are mainly received
packets that we need to classify to detect relevant activities. We
propose an unsupervised method for detecting activities from
monitoring data, in particular collected from a darknet by us-
ing Topological Data Analysis (TDA). This approach consists
in generating representations from complex high dimensional
data and extract their invariant topological features to discover
relationships and patterns in data. The TDA technique has
the advantage to be coordinate and deformation invariant, and
it is able to deal with compressed representation. It does
not depend on a coordinate system so it is able to analyse
monitoring data collected from different format. It is also
less sensitive to noise and it is able to handle approximate
data. These features guide our choice in using this approach
since a darknet collect all data without distinction a priori,
e.g. multiple attacks or packets due to misconfigurations are
mixed together, can only observe a partially an activity wider
than the size of the considered subnetwork, e.g. a scan at the
Internet scale.
In this work, we have mainly applied the Mapper algorithm
[17] from TDA coupled with DBSCAN clustering algorithm
[18] to reveal patterns of activities observed from a darknet.
The Mapper technique is combining data projection over
overlapping hyper cubes and partial clustering within each of
them. It is more robust to noise and it is able to extract in
better way patterns from darknet data than using grouping by
attributes. The output of the algorithm is a graph where each
node represents a cluster of packets. Edges are created between
nodes if they share a common packet. The Mapper algorithm
mainly requires two parameters to control the resolution of
the obtained graph which are the number of intervals over
the range of the filter function values and the percentage of
overlap between successive intervals.
C. Detailed technique
As a pre-processing step, we extract six features from each
packet: the timestamp, the source and destination IP addresses
and ports, and the protocol (TCP, UDP or ICMP). Each packet
is then mapped to a vector in R6 by converting the selected
6 features to numerical format. IP addresses are represented
by their respective integer values between 0 and 232. We used
the integer values of the ports and we encoded the name of
the protocols to numerical values. We have to note that in
this work, we have chosen from a darknet packet 6 features,
however the TDA technique itself could be applied on high
dimensional data since it takes as input vectors of size n
without making a restriction on this size.
Then, the unsupervised mapper algorithm of TDA as de-
tailed in [17] is applied on the obtained vectors to transform
the packets feature space into a topological space. The mapper
algorithm extracts geometric features of the data to represent
them as simplicial complexes or data shapes of relevant
activities in a darknet. It proceeds in the following steps.
First, a filter function is applied to provide a value to each
data point. In the general use of TDA, interesting dimensions
are selected at this step, using knowledge about the shape
of the data. In our case, a priori knowledge is weak and
this selection has been made at the time of the vectorisation.
The filter is therefore R6 identity most of the time. The
only exception is the use of the projection R6 7→ R5 which
removes the time component in order to associate packets
that repeat in time (see DDoS section IV-C). The dataset
is then divided into smaller subsets by dividing the filter’s
range into a set of smaller overlapping intervals. Hence the
original 6-dimensional hypercube containing all data is divided
into multiple and overlapping 6-dimensional hypercubes. This
step relies on two parameters: the first parameter is the
resolution which represents the length of the interval over the
filter function range and the second parameter is the overlap
parameter which represents the percentage of overlap between
successive intervals.
The second step consists into applying the clustering algo-
rithm, DBSCAN, within each individual hypercube. It takes
two parameters, ε and minpts along with the data. It will
mark as being in the same cluster, the points having at least
minpts at a distance lower than ε (neighbours) and will
propagate the search to those neighbours. A point is considered
as noise if it has less than minpts neighbours. To compute
the similarity between the packets when using the DBSCAN
clustering algorithm, we have used the following metrics.
For the timestamp attribute and IP destination addresses, the
difference between their respective values is suitable metric
since the former is a measurable quantity and the latter are
within the same /20 subnetwork. For the source IP addresses,
we also used the distance between their respective values as a
metric, that could be problematic if the IP addresses are not in
Fig. 1. Example of a 2 dimensions dataset of a scanning activity observed
by a darknet (original data).
the same subnetwork. For instance, with this metric the address
2.2.2.2 will be more close to 3.3.3.3 than 11.11.11.11. For the
protocol names and ports, we have used the equality metric
between their respective values to output 0 or 1 since a distance
between their values does not make sense. The proposed
metrics to measure the similarity between packets remains
simplistic since they could cluster packets from different
subnetworks with a close difference, but our results show
that they remain good heuristics for clustering scanning and
DDoS activities. We have made this choice since to the best
of our knowledge, there are no well known distance metrics
for measuring the similarities for network packet attributes,
mainly regarding IP addresses, protocol names and ports.
The final output of the algorithm is a topological graph
where each node is a cluster of points within one hypercube.
If two clusters (from different hypercubes) have one or more
shared points with respect to the specified overlapping interval,
the nodes are linked together.
D. Example of a scanning activity
To illustrate the mapper algorithm, we applied the TDAmap-
per R package [19] on a single dataset of a scanning activity
manually extracted from the darknet. From this dataset we
considered only 2 dimensions which are the source and the
destination IP addresses of each received scanning packet. We
have firstly projected the dataset in its two dimensions space
as depicted in Figure 1. We mainly observe 5 vertical lines
at the different scanning sources over the destination IPs of
the darknet. Addresses have been normalised using a min-
max scaler. Then, for demonstration purposes, we applied on
the dataset the DBSCAN clustering algorithm with ε = 0.2
and minpts = 3. The algorithm finds 14 clusters that are
represented with different colours on the original data as
depicted in Figure 2(a). DBSCAN is able to identify the first
two vertical lines as distinct clusters since they are dense but
not the other vertical lines identified as multiple clusters.
Then, we applied TDA on the same dataset with a 30
intervals resolution and 50% of overlap (which implies many
DBSCAN executions). The result is depicted in Figure 2(b)
(a) The dataset clustered using the DBSCAN algo-
rithm with ε = 0.2 and minpts = 3.
(b) The mapper graph of the dataset using 30
intervals with 50% overlap.
(c) The dataset clustered with the nodes of the
mapper graph.
Fig. 2. Analysis applied to the two-dimensional example of Figure 1
where 5 nodes appear, divided in a single node and 2 groups
of 2 connected nodes. Each node is annotated with the number
of contained points and the minimum and maximum value of
its associated interval. In Figure 2(c), we have coloured the
original data with the colours of the nodes of the mapper
graph. We observe that each group of 2 connected nodes
represents two close vertical scanning lines and the isolated
node of the graph represents the last vertical scanning line at
the right side of the figure. In this example, we have shown
that the mapper algorithm with partial DBSCAN clustering
is clearly able to identify the patterns of a scanning activity.
Then, our goal is to apply the mapper technique to process a
noisy dataset collected from a darknet as depicted in Figure
3(a) to extract such patterns.
E. Implementation details
We have implemented our own tool of the mapper algorithm
to extract topological graphs by processing darknet packets
and also their visualisation with 3D coordinate system with
coloured links between two planes. As already introduced, one
plane represents the source IP address and port of the packet
and the second plane represents the destination IP address and
the port of the packets. This 3D visualisation is similar to
the technique proposed by Nunnally et al [20]. Before any
processing, the result is similar to Figure 3(a).
Our mapper tool relies on an extended code from Ke-
plerMapper (github.com/MLWave/kepler-mapper), ported to
Python3 and not requiring Sklearn anymore. The simplicial
complex created by the Mapper is rendered as a 2D graph
using physical-like forces (Figure 3(b)). The size of each point
is proportional to the logarithm of the number of packets
it contains. Furthermore, our approach relies on DBSCAN
as described before. Due to efficiency reason, it has been
implemented in C. To quickly find the ε neighbors, various
methods exist but we preferred to use a naive search since
the number of dimensions is rather high and a pre-calculation
using space partitioning is therefore more costly than con-
sidering each packet on typical inputs (n = 1000). On large
inputs (n = 100000) it has nearly the same performance than
Scikit-Learn implementation which was first used, whereas it
is more efficient on small ones.
The output of the mapper is a simplicial complex, repre-
sented by a flat graph as shown in Figure 3b. The colors
arbitrarily associated to each connected component can then
be used to color every packet of each component on the previ-
ous three-dimensional visualisation, giving representations as
shown in Figure 3(c).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Separating patterns
A first run on the data depicted in Figure 3(a) leads to the
graph obtained in Figure 3(b). After manual investigation, we
found that the large green dot is a scanning activity trying
to exploit a known router vulnerability on port 53413. The
red component denotes a set of packets looking for Telnet or
SSH accesses. The orange one is a sparse scan on those ports
but originated by a single address. The yellow component
gathered two randomized scans and some noise. They may
be discriminated by tuning the algorithm parameters. Using
the topological analysis technique, we are able to separate
efficiently different malicious activity patterns while they are
originally highly mixed as shown in Figure 3(c), where each
cluster color is reported on its individual packet.
B. Topologies of scanning activities
The spatial continuity of sweeping scans makes them really
easy to identify out of noise, even with overlapping schemes.
A small ε coupled with a important minpts value will drive
the clustering to produce accurate slices of scan while a small
overlap value allows the mapper to group those slices coher-
ently. With our implementation applied on the 6 normalized
dimensions, ε = 0.05, minpts = 20, overlap = 5%, we
obtained good results. We have to note that the parameter
values are set manually using a trial and error method until
a pattern is detected and then they remain valid for similar
patterns.
Figure 4 is the result of this scan analysis with more data
than Figure 3(a). Since the packets marked as noise by the
(a) Original data: The source plane is on the left
and the darknet on the right. Packets shown in blue
are of TCP type and the red ones are UDP.
(b) Clustered Mapper graph (c) Original data coloured by cluster
Fig. 3. Topological analysis of 1000 packets captured on the 13 April 2016 with ε = 0.5, minpts = 3, overlap = 10%.
Fig. 4. Scan detection using the mapper on 8000 consecutive packets. Scans
are distinct and countable.
clustering are not drawn, the result is much more understand-
able than a raw visualisation as proposed by Nunnally and al
[20] and depicted in Figure 3(a). Slices of scans are clearly
visible where multiple IP addresses of our darknet are being
targeted. The only variable that have been chosen to obtain a
well-looking render is the starting point of the packet fetch in
order to have a range of scanning behaviours. As continuous
scans are really similar, those parameters are suitable for the
whole data we have.
We have also applied the official set of rules of Suricata
version 3.0 on the same dataset to detect inside them scanning
activities. We found that Suricata was able to detect only four
of them because its rules mainly rely on grouping packets
within a time window to detect such activities.
C. Topologies of DDoS activities
Running the mapper on another day, we found a large cluster
on the graph from 10 am to the end of the day. On the 3D view
however, it appears a discrete line. The explanation is that the
same packet has been sent at a high rate. This UDP packet
with 53 as source port is a DNS response to a supposed request
(i.e. one of our darknet IP address has been spoofed). This is
available for the first 1203 packets while the rest of the packets
(318710) are DNS failure messages to the requested domain.
With more than 310 000 packets sent over 16h (a darknet IP
usually receives about 3000 packets daily), no deep analysis
is necessary (statistical approach would have been suitable).
However, the interesting fact is that topological analysis would
have worked as well – i.e. present a dot in the graph – on a
much shorter time, where statistical tools may not be triggered.
For DDoS, the spatial connection between packets is re-
duced and therefore they are more difficult to identify. The
visualisation shown in Figure 5 is isolating one DDoS by
considering only UDP packets and only clusters with at least
10 elements. Such filtering is legitimate as a DDoS is usually
targeted towards a unique protocol and should involve many
packets, and so bigger clusters. As the available data is less
than in the previous cases, parameters should have been
exaggerated (ε = 0.03, minpts = 100, overlap = 0.01) to
regroup them in a single component.
We have to note that despite the apparent sparseness due to
the large number of sources, each source is sending maximum
number of packets to the destination. It creates several clusters
that are even more dense than scans. Parameters sufficient to
eliminate scan will keep them. After the clustering, the Mapper
algorithm is gathering them.
D. Performance analysis
The machine on which tests have been run is equipped with
a Quad Core CPU cadenced at 2.83GHz, a 15GB RAM and
works with Linux Mint. A not parallelised analysis including
clustering and mapping of 1024 packets takes between 0.4s
and 0.9s, depending on the packets themselves. Using the four
cores and a 20% overlap of datasets, our approach provides
Fig. 5. Visualisation of a DDoS using Mapper. Many different sources are
suddenly sending UDP packets to a single port on a single address. The simple
lines that still appear are in fact constituted of a heavily repeated packet that
could be either a non-distributed DoS or a misconfigured device.
acceptable performance since an approximate number of 3
millions packets per day are analyzed in 11 minutes. The
clustering is indeed quadratic in the worst case but it is
applied on hypercubes that represent only a fraction of the
data. Besides, the apparent complexity is below quadratic in
all our practical experiments. More computing power could
be used to increase the number of hypercubes. Three divisions
over the six dimensions, resulting in 729 hypercubes have been
used in this work. However, finer analysis would be obtained
with a more important number of hybercubes, coupled with a
algorithm deciding which dimensions are the more useful to
slice precisely.
For 32768 packets simultaneously, which already represent
more than a quarter hour and is sufficient with most requests
(for example what has this known attacker sent today?), two
minutes are required. Hence, a human analyst can use our tool
in an near real-time analysis by clustering the data within a
time or space window (number of packets) and updating the
visualization. Making the tool operating in real-time requires
mainly more computing resources and the parallelization of
the tool.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a methodology relying on
topological analysis applied on network packets. It is able to
cope with large volume of traffic in order to extract groups of
packets belonging to the same activity, especially malicious
ones, even if they are all heavily mixed. Our experimental
validation demonstrates this ability on real data collected from
a darknet and shows that our method discovered efficiently
more scans than the well-used IDS Suricata. Our developed
tool is currently for internal use, however it could be provided
upon request. In future work, the approach and its associated
tool will be extended to consider other types of abnormal
traffic as well as integrating new dimensions from packet
headers and contents.
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